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Miller: Inadequacy of the Average-Audience Test

NOTE
NEWTON v. DIAMOND:

WHEN A COMPOSER'S MARKET IS
NOT THE AVERAGE JOE: THE
INADEQUACY OF THE AVERAGEAUDIENCE TEST
INTRODUCTION

In 1978, avant-garde jazz flautist and composer James Newton
composed "Choir," a song inspired by his early memory of four women
singing gospel church music in rural Arkansas. I "Choir" is not a
traditional song. 2 In addition to its gospel music influence, "Choir"
contains elements of Japanese ceremonial court music, classical music,
and African music? The most untraditional sonic characteristics of the
song, however, are achieved by playing the flute in a very unorthodox
manner.4 The song requires that the performer play one note on the flute
by over-blowing into the instrument while simultaneously singing a
pattern of three other notes. 5 The effect of this simultaneous overblowing and singing is a unique sound that is described as multiphonics.6

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004).
See generally, Petition For Writ Of Certiorari, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219).
3 [d. at 3-4 (citing Appellant's excerpts of record filed in the Ninth Circuit on September 30,
2(02).
I

2

5

See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).
[d. at 1191.

6

[d.

4

I
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In Newton's "Choir," this effect sounds something like the wind blowing
briskly through the trees.
Three years after composing the song, Newton performed and
recorded "Choir.,,7 At that time, he licensed all rights in that sound
recording of "Choir" to ECM Records for $5,000. 8 However, Newton
retained the copyright to the underlying composition of "Choir," as
embodied in his written score of the song. 9
In 1992, the Beastie Boys sampled a six-second portion of "Choir"
in the recording of their song, "Pass The Mic.,,10 At that time, the
Beastie Boys obtained a license from ECM Records to use portions of
the sound recording of "Choir" for a one-time fee of $1,000." However,
the Beastie Boys did not obtain a license from Newton for use of the
underlying composition of "Choir.,,12 As a result, Newton brought an
action against the Beastie Boys in 2000 for copyright infringement of his
composition "Choir.,,13
In Newton v. Diamond, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
granted summary judgment in favor of the Beastie BoYS.14 The decision
of the court was based on the sole ground that the Beastie Boys'
unauthorized use of a sample of Newton's composition was trivial and
therefore not significant enough to constitute infringement. 15 The court
determined the sample's triviality by concluding that the average
audience would not recognize Newton's hand as the composer of the
Beastie Boys' sample. 16 This analysis is called the average-audience
test, where an unauthorized use will be considered so trivial as to avoid
legal consequences if an average audience would not recognize that a

Id .
sId.
9 Id.

7

10 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004); See also id. at 1190 (describing
sampling as "the incorporation of a short segment of a musical recording into a new musical
recording . . . . "); See also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.N.J. 1993)
(describing sampling as "the conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The digital code
that describes the sampled music . . . can then be reused, manipulated or combined with other
digitalized or recorded sounds using a machine with digital data processing capabilities, such as a ..
. computerized synthesizer." (quoting Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital
Sampling
Issues,
207
N.Y.LJ.
7,
n.3
(May
22,
1992»;
See
also
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilBeastie_Boys (describing the Beastie Boys as "an American hip-hop
group from New York City.").
II Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191.

12

Id.

Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1247 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004).
15 Id.
16 Id . at 1196.
13

14
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copying has occurred. 17
This Note will discuss how the Ninth Circuit incorrectly adopted the
average-audience test because the test has become overbroad in its
application, is ill-equipped to deal with the issues of complex modem
music, and has drifted from the fundamental purpose of copyright law.
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted the intended-audience test, which
looks to the reaction of those with the expertise required to understand
the language of the work and more truly reflects the fundamental purpose
of copyright law: the protection of the creator's market. 18
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevant background as it relates
to the average-audience test. 19 Part II will examine the legal foundation
that the Newton court relied on in its opinion. 2o Part III will discuss the
Newton court's analysis of the case in light of the legal foundation it
established?1 Part III will also discuss the dissenting opinion in
Newton?2 Part IV will examine a different approach taken by the courts
by focusing on the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the more focused
intended-audience test. 23 Part V will reconsider the development of the
average-audience test in the Ninth Circuit and compare the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning to that of the Fourth Circuit. 24 Part VI will consider
the benefits and burdens of the intended-audience test as practically
applied?5 Finally, Part VII will conclude that the Ninth Circuit failed to
clarify the law by adopting the average-audience test, and should have
adopted the intended-audience test. 26
I.

BACKGROUND

Congress's power to grant copyright was founded on an economic
incentive theory?? Because a musician's financial gain is a direct result
of the public's approbation of his or her work, the best way to stimulate
the arts for the benefit of the general public is through the encouragement
of individual effort through personal financial gain. 28 As a result, courts
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,434 (9th Cir. 1986).
See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 129-146 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
28 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1946); See, e.g., Mazer. 347 U.S. at 219.
17

18
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concluded that the impression of the general public, or lay listener, was
the best method to determine infringement of a protected work. 29 This
sound foundational logic led to the development of the average-audience
test, which looks to the reaction of the ordinary lay listener to determine
whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted musical work is
sufficiently substantial to be considered infringement. 3o
The modern musical language is extremely diverse?l Today's
musical vernacular includes such distinct genres as avant-garde jazz,
minimalism, hip-hop, electronica, and microtonal music. 32 Further,
concurrent advances in technology have enabled a new generation of
musicians to create music in new forms using their home computer. 33
This diversity of musical idioms and advance in technology have created
a complexity to the modern musical language that challenges what is
defined as popular music. 34 Because popular music is not as easily
defined as it once was, some courts have reconsidered the relevance of
the average-audience test in light of the logic upon which it was
developed?5 The Fourth Circuit, for example, has chosen to adopt the
intended-audience test. 36 This test focuses not on the reaction of the
ordinary lay listener, but rather a listener who fairly represents that
work's intended aUdience. 37 While other courts have adopted a more
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
See id.; See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986).
31 Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief at 12, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d
1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219) (arguing "the court should adopt an approach ... that respects
the wide diversity of musical practice.").
32 Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 04-1219) (discussing the "breadth and diversity of style and manner among modem artists,"
e.g., Cecil Taylor, the late works of John Coltrane, Steve Reich, Phillip Glass, Run D.M.C., Dr. Dre,
Orbital, Aphex Twin, Charles Ives, Harry Partch).
33 Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief at 9-10, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d
1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219) (discussing the development of low-cost music editing software
such as Pro-Tools).
34 See generally, Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief, Newton v. Diamond, 388
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219).
35 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding '''intended audience'
should supplant 'ordinary observer' as the label for the appropriate test."); Whelan Associates, Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1986) (arguing" ... the ordinary
observer test is not useful and potentially misleading when the subjects of the copyright are
particularly complex .... "); Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[iln
cases where the target audience possesses specialized expertise, however, the specialist's perception
of similarity may be much different from the lay observer's, and it is appropriate in such cases to
consider similarity from the specialist's perspective.").
36 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
37 Id. at 736-737 (holding "Such an inquiry may include ... testimony from members of the
intended audience or, possibly, from those who possess expertise with reference to the tastes and
perceptions of the intended aUdience.").
29

30
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focused test, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly chosen to uphold the
average-audience test in Newton v. Diamond?8
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION: LAYING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION

In the majority opinion written by Judge Mary M. Schroeder, the

Ninth Circuit held that the Beastie Boys' unauthorized use of a sample of
Newton's musical composition was trivial and therefore not actionable. 39
The court held that "trivial copying does not constitute actionable
infringement.'.40 Although the District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Beastie Boys on two separate grounds,41 the Ninth Circuit
explicitly affirmed solely on the ground that the Beastie Boys' use was
trivia1. 42 The court affirmed that the test for triviality is whether or not
the average audience would recognize the appropriation. 43
A.

DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX: A TRIVIALITY DEFENSE TO
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex" establishes the broad
principle that the law does not concern itself with trifles. 44 In
determining the maxim's applicability to copyright law, the Newton court
relied on Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television to conclude that
"[f]or an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, the
use must be significant enough to constitute infringement.',45 While the
Ringgold court provided an extensive analysis of the de minimis maxim
as it applied to copyright law,46 the Newton court relied on the decision
to support its basic conclusion that even where the issue of copying is not
in dispute (i.e., in the case of sampling), "no legal consequences will
follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.',47 In order to
38

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).

39

[d. at 1190.

40

[d. at 1193; See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.

1997).
41 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1260 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (holding that the notes in
question lacked sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection and, even if the sampled
portion was sufficiently original, the use was trivial and therefore not actionable.).
42 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004).
43 [d. at 1193 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,434 (9th Cir. 1986)).
44 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004); See also Ringgold v. Black Entm't
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
45 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192-1193 (9th Cir. 2004); See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at
74-75.
46 See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-76.
47 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
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emphasize that this principle has "long been a part of copyright law," the
court quoted Judge Learned Hand's observation from eighty years ago:
"[e]ven where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive of
infringement.,,48 As a result, the Ninth Circuit firmly established its
acceptance of the de minimis doctrine as a triviality defense to a
copyright infringement action. 49
B.

THE AVERAGE-AUDIENCE TEST DETERLViIi"llcS WHEN
UNAUTHORIZED COPYING IS DE MINIMIS

To determine when an unauthorized copying is de rmmrms, the
Newton Court relied on its own decision in Fisher v. Dees to hold that "a
use is de minimis only if the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation.,,50 The court was very explicit in concluding that the de
minimis maxim looks to "the response of the average audience, or
ordinary observer, to determine whether a use is infringing.,,51 Thus, in
the Ninth Circuit, a successful de minimis defense to a copyright
infringement claim will depend on whether the average audience, or
ordinary observer, is able to recognize that a copying has taken place. 52
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

After establishing the average-audience test as the proper test for a
de minimis analysis, the court turned to the analysis of the facts before
it. 53 First, the court analyzed the Beastie Boys' sample by examining the
testimony of expert witnesses. 54 After eliminating from consideration
those elements that were properly licensed, the court measured the
substantiality of the sample. 55 Finally, the court concluded that if the
sample is not substantial, then the average audience would not recognize
it and the sample is thus de minimis and not actionable. 56 Judge Susan P.
Graber's dissent agreed with the legal principles set out in the majority,
but disagreed with the majority's analysis of the expert witness

48

[d. (quoting West Publ'g Co. v. Edward Thomson Co .• 169 F. 833, 861 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.

49

See id.

1909)).
[d.; See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986).
51 Newton v. Diamond. 388 F.3d 1189. 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 [d. at 1194-1196.
55 [d. at 1195-1196.
56 [d. at 1196.
50
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testimony. 57
A.

ANALYZING THE BEASTIE BOYS' SAMPLE

The court recognized that the Beastie Boys had properly licensed
the sound recording of Newton's "Choir" from ECM Records but had
not licensed the underlying composition to "Choir" from Newton. 58
Thus, the case concerns only the infringement of Newton's actual written
score of "Choir" as opposed to the sound recording. 59 As a result, the
court began its analysis with the arduous process of filtering out the
licensed elements of the sound recording from the unlicensed elements in
Newton's score. 60 Because this is a truly complex and challenging task,
the court found it must rely on the testimony of expert witnesses in
determining which elements of the sample are a result of the
performance and which are indicated in the original score. 61
According to the majority, the expert witness testimony that Newton
himself presented revealed that the elements and subtleties of the
particular performance of "Choir" that the Beastie Boys sampled were
largely the product of particular techniques employed by the performer
and not the result of a rendition of the score. 62 Dr. Christopher Dobrian
of the University of California, Irvine, declared that "breath control,"
"portamento," and "emphasis of the upper partials of the flute's complex
harmonic tone" are three elements that do not appear in the score of
"Choir" but are present in the sampled performance. 63 Because the
sampled performance is performed by Newton himself, these elements
are referred to collectively as the "Newton Technique.,,64 Because the
"Newton Technique" did not appear in the score for "Choir," it was
accordingly filtered out and removed from consideration in Newton's
claim for infringement of his composition.65
B.

MEASURING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SAMPLE

With the "Newton Technique" filtered out of consideration, the

57

58
59

60
61

62

63
64
65

See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (1. Graber dissenting).
/d. at 1193 (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 1193-1194.
Id. at 1194.
1d.

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id.
1d.
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court turned to the heart of its inquiry: "whether the Beastie Boys'
unauthorized use of the composition, as opposed to their authorized use
of the sound recording, was substantial enough to sustain an
infringement action.,,66 The substantiality of the Beastie Boys' sample
was measured "by considering the qualitative and quantitative
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff's work as a
whole.,,67 Thus, in determining if a sample is substantial enough to
support an infringement action, a court must decide if that sample is a
quantitatively and qualitatively significant portion of the original work. 68
In determining the sample's quantitative significance the court
looked at evidence of the length of the sample compared to the length of
the original work as a whole. 69 The sampled segment occurred once in
the original piece and "[ w]hen played ... the segment lasts six seconds
and is roughly two percent of the four-and-a-half minute 'Choir' sound
recording . . . . ,,70 The court concluded that this was not enough to
qualify as a quantitatively significant portion of the original work. 71
The sample's qualitative significance was not as straightforward. 72
The court therefore relied on the expert testimony of renowned pianist
and music theorist Dr. Lawrence Ferrara. 73 Dr. Ferrara testified that "the
compositional elements of the sampled section do not represent the heart
or the hook of the 'Choir' composition, but rather are 'simple, minimal
and insignificant.,,,74 According to the majority, no direct evidence
rebutted Dr. Ferrara's conclusion that the sample was not a qualitatively
significant portion of the entire work. 75 In the majority's opinion, the
other experts gave no information from which a jury could infer that the
sample was a qualitatively significant portion of the original
composition. 76 By relying on the testimony of Ferrara, the court
concluded that the sample the Beastie Boys used was not a quantitatively
or qualitatively significant portion of Newton's "Choir.,,77

66

[d.

67

[d. at 1195.
See ill.

68

69
70
71

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).
[d. at 1195-1196.
[d. at 1195.

See id. at 1196.
[d.; See also http://education.nyu.edulmusic/facu1ty/ferrara_1awrence.html
74 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Beastie Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara).
75 [d.
76 [d.
72

73

77

See id.
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IF THE SAMPLE Is NOT SUBSTANTIAL, IT FAILS THE A VERAGEAUDIENCE TEST

After concluding that the sampled portion of "Choir" was neither a
quantitatively nor a qualitatively significant portion of the work, the
court returned to its legal foundation: the average-audience test. 78 Based
on the expert testimony that the sample is neither a quantitatively nor a
qualitatively significant portion of Newton's "Choir", the court
concluded "that an average audience would not discern Newton's hand
as a composer, apart from his talent as a performer, from Beastie Boys'
use of the sample.,,79 Therefore, the finding that the sample was neither
quantitatively nor qualitatively significant to the original work as a whole
is to say the sample is de minimis and an average audience would not
recognize the appropriation. so In lay terms, because the sample was a
"trite, generic three-note sequence," it follows that an average audience
. . SI
wou ld not recogmze It.
D.

THE DISSENT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT Is INAPPROPRIATE

Circuit Judge Susan P. Graber filed a dissenting opinion concluding,
"a finder of fact reasonably could find that Beastie Boys' use of sampled
material was not de minimis."s2 It is important here to recognize that
Judge Graber agreed with the legal principles that the majority laid out,
but disagreed with the court's analysis of the evidence and expert
testimony.s3 In accordance with the majority, Judge Graber affirmed the
average-audience test as the method for determining whether an
unauthorized use is de minimis. s4 However, Judge Graber's analysis of
the evidence and expert testimony would lead to a different conclusion,
where "the composition, standing alone, is distinctive .... "S5
Judge Graber relied on the testimony of Dr. Christopher Dobrian of
the University of California, Irvine, who described the sample used by
the Beastie Boys as a direct result of a playing technique indicated in the
score. S6 Dr. Dobrian explained that much of this technique is a result of

78/d.

1d.
80 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189,1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
81 Id. (quoting Beastie Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara).
82/d. at 1197 (Graber, J., dissenting).
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 1d.

79

86

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting).
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the score itself and not personal performance, and any flautist's rendition
of the score would yield the same sonic result. 87 Dr. Dobrian' s testimony
certainly does seem to contradict the majority's filtering out of the
"Newton Technique.',88 Further, Judge Graber complained that the
majority had ignored other parts of Dr. Dobrian's relevant testimony that
describes the sampled portion of "Choir" as unique and distinctive. 89 In
Judge Graber's view, this was evidence that reasonable ears could
consider the sampled portion qualitatively significant when compared to
the work as a whole. 90 This evidence, in Judge Graber's opinion, created
a genuine issue of material fact that should render summary judgment
inappropriate.91
Although Judge Graber's analysis of the sample of "Choir" differed
from the majority, her approach was the same: the sample "is de minimis
only if an average audience would not recognize [the] appropriation,"
where the reaction of the average audience is determined with the
assistance of expert witness testimony.92
IV. A DIFFERENT ApPROACH: THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE TEST
In Newton, the Ninth Circuit squarely adopted the average-audience
test in de minimis analysis for copyright infringement. 93 Other circuits,
however, have held that reliance on the language of the average-audience
test caused the rule to become overbroad in practice, departing from the
original logic on which the test was based. 94 For example, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the intended-audience test better reflects the
theory of economic incentive on which copyright law is based. 95

87

[d.

88 Compare [d. (indicating Dr. Dobrian's testimony states "that any flautist's performance of
the sampled segment would be distinctive and recognizable, because the score itself is distinctive
and recognizable."), with Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194 (majority opinion) (indicating that "the sound
recording of 'Choir' is the product of Newton's highly developed performance techniques, rather
than the result of a generic rendition of the composition.").
89 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1198 (Graber, 1., dissenting).
90 [d.
91 [d. at 1197; See also 4 MELVILLEB. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[E][3][b1(2005).
92 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1197 (Graber, 1., dissenting).
93 [d. at 1196 (majority opinion).
94 See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990); See, e.g., Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. laslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1986); See, e.g.,
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003).
95 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 734.
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THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVE

The theory that underlies the average-audience test with respect to
copyright law is laid out in the seminal case of Arnstein v. Porter. 96 Like
Newton, Arnstein involved alleged copyright infringement of a musical
composition. 97 The intended purpose of protecting such compositions
was stated by the court to be based on a theory of economic incentive,
under which "[t]he plaintiffs legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns
from his compositions which derive from the lay public's approbation of
his efforts.,,98 This economic incentive theory reflects what has long
been the purpose behind Congress's grant of copyright: the
"encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in
Science and useful ArtS.,,99 Thus, the Arnstein court declared, "[t]he
question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff s works so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."loo
The reaction of the lay listener is important to determine the effect of the
appropriation on the plaintiffs market. 101 Perhaps as a testament to the
soundness of the economic incentive theory, it would be almost fortyfive years before this logic would be reexamined and the role of the lay
listener reconsidered. 102
B.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S ADOPTION OF THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE
TEST

In Dawson v. Hinshaw, the Fourth Circuit reexamined the logic of
Arnstein and the development of the average-aUdience test in light of the
principles of copyright law and the underlying policies.103 While the
Dawson court clearly supported the logic of the economic incentive
theory as laid out in Arnstein, it explained that the reliance upon the lay
listener had caused the rule to become too broad, ultimately departing

96

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).

97

[d. at 467.

98

[d. at 473.

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
100 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
101 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
102 See generally, Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
103 [d. at 733.
99
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from the original logic fostered in Arnstein. 104
The distinction between the type of work allegedly infringed upon
in Arnstein and that in Dawson drove the court's conclusion.105 Dawson
involved the copyright infringement of a spiritual arrangement, 106
whereas Arnstein involved the copyright infringement of a popular
composition. 107 The Dawson court concluded that, "under the facts
before it ... the Arnstein court appropriately perceived 'lay listeners' and
the works' 'audience' to be the same.,,108 However, the Dawson court
correctly pointed out that the logic in Arnstein was founded upon the
protection of the creator's market. 109 Thus, in evaluating the effect of an
unauthorized use of a protected work on the creator's market, the lay
listener is important only insofar as that listener accurately represents
that market. 110 Because Dawson involved the copyright infringement of
a spiritual arrangement as opposed to a popular recording, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the average lay listener might inaccurately reflect
the market for that type of work. III Thus, an application of the averageaudience test to the facts in Dawson could potentially look to the reaction
of a group other than the creator's market. 112 This result would seem to
contradict the economic incentive theory of copyright law as expressed
in Arnstein.
Based on this interpretation of the economic incentive theory
originally laid out in Arnstein and supported by the purpose of copyright
law generally, the Dawson court held that when inquiring into an illicit
appropriation, "a district court must consider the nature of the intended
audience of the plaintiffs work.,,113 The court wisely set forth a more
narrowly tailored test because, over time, the average-audience test had
become overbroad and had departed from the foundation upon which it
stood. I 14

Id. at 734.
Id. at 737.
106 Id. at 732.
107 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468 (2d Cir. 1946).
108 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
109 Id.
110 Id.

104

lOS

III See id. at 737-738 (finding that although "a lay person's reaction may be an accurate
indicator of extent to which those in the market for a popular recording will perceive another
recording to be substantially similar, a lay person's reaction might not be an accurate indicator of
how expert choral directors would compare two spiritual arrangements.").
112 See id. at 735-736.
113 Id. at 736.
114 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT: REASONING AND PRACTICE

The Fourth Circuit's clear adoption of the intended-audience test
based on the sound theory of economic incentive provides a useful
perspective in reviewing the history of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. I 15
While the court in Newton v. Diamond squarely adopted the averageaudience test with respect to de minimis analysis, a closer reading of that
and prior Ninth Circuit opinions indicates that perhaps its reasoning is
not radically different from that which the Fourth Circuit employed. I 16
A.

SID & MARTY KROFFTV. McDoNALD'S: FOUNDATION AND LOGIC

Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's is a landmark case in Ninth
Circuit copyright jurisprudence. ll7 The court concluded that "[t]he test
to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity in
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one depending on the response
of the ordinary reasonable person.,,1l8 At first blush the court seemed to
squarely establish the reaction of the ordinary lay person as the test for
the substantiality of a copyright infringement which would, in tum,
support the Newton court's holding. However, further probing of the
opinion suggests otherwise.
First, the court relied upon the logic of Arnstein in its application of
the aforementioned test by quoting, "[t]he question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiff s works so much of what is pleasing to the
(eyes and) ears of lay (persons), who comprise the audience for whom
such popular (works are) composed . ...,,119 In looking to the reaction
of the audience for whom the work was composed, the court adopted the
economic incentive theory and the importance of the creator's market. 120
Then, in an application of that foundational theory to the facts of its case,
the court looked to the reactions of the works' specifically intended
audience: children. l2l "The present case demands an even more intrinsic
determination because both plaintiff s and defendant's works are directed
to an audience of children. This raises the particular factual issue of the

See id. at 736.
116 See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
117 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); See
also Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
118 Sid & Marty Krafft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164.
119 [d. at 1165 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-473 (2d Cir. 1946)) (emphasis
added).
120 See Sid & Marty Krafft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164.
121 [d. at 1166.
115
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impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of
young people.,,122 Although the court was establishing the benchmark as
the reaction of the ordinary reasonable person, a closer examination of
the court's logic reveals that it was in fact looking more toward the
reaction of the ordinary, reasonable person who is part of the works'
intended audience in an effort to protect the creator's market. 123
B.

NEWTON V. DIAMOND: REASONING AND LANGUAGE RECONSIDERED

In Newton, a similar inconsistency exists between the language of
the test applied and the analysis of the court. In the conclusion of its

analysis, the court relied upon the expert opinion of Beastie Boys' expert
Dr. Lawrence Ferrara. 124 It was Dr. Ferrara's opinion that the Beastie
Boys' sample was not qualitatively significant, which partly provided the
court's basis for concluding that an average audience would not
recognize Newton's composition from the Beastie Boys' unauthorized
use. 125 However, Dr. Ferrara is not representative of an average audience
but rather is exactly the type of person that represents the specific
intended market of such an avant-garde jazz score. 126 Someone likely to
purchase such a work would have expertise in line with that of Dr.
Ferrara. 127 Looking to his reaction is similar to looking to the reaction of
someone likely to be in a purchasing position for Newton's work. l2S In
its reliance on the opinion of the creator's market, the Newton court was
not looking to the response of the average audience but was really
looking to the response of the intended audience.
VI. THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE TEST AND MUSIC SAMPLING: BENEFITS
AND BURDENS

Courts and scholars alike have examined the intended-audience test
in consideration of its benefits and burdens when practically applied. 129
Id.
123 See id. at 1164-1166; See also Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734-735 (4th Cir. 1990).
124 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
125
Id.
126 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[sluch an inquiry may
include, and in no doubt many cases will require, admission of testimony ... from those who
possess expertise with references to the tastes and perceptions of the intended audience. ").
127 See id. at 737.
128 See id.
122

129 See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (arguing that "the lay
observer test spares a court the burden of inquiring into . . . the nature of the works' intended
aUdience."); See, e.g., Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea·Expression in Musical Analysis and the
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It is true that the intended-audience test places a burden on the court in
examining the nature of such an aUdience. 13o However, this burden is
outweighed by the benefit of providing more focused guidance which
will reduce the possibility of erroneous findings, address the needs of
increasingly complex music and media, and properly sustain the true
purpose of copyright law. 131
The courts have recognized that audience tests in general inherently
involve issues of fact, and as a result, summary judgment has been
disfavored. 132 It follows that an application of the intended-audience test
would involve increased issues of fact, requiring increased analysis on
the part the courts, and an increased need for such issues of fact to be
litigated at trial. 133 Indeed, the Dawson court explained the increased
burden of shifting from the lay observer test to that of the intended
audience: "[t]he lay observer test spares the court the burden of inquiring
into, and drawing conclusions from, the nature of the works' intended
audience.,,134 This burden is very real and should be weighed against the
benefits of the test.
Ambiguity and vagueness with respect to the average-audience test
have bred inconsistencies among the courts: some courts have defined
the test as the response of the ordinary lay listener without the aid of
analytic dissection or expert testimony,135 whereas some courts have
looked more narrowly at the specific audience to whom the work is
directed,136 and still other courts have relied upon expert witness
testimony to gauge the reaction of an average audience. 137 Such
inconsistent application of the law increases the risk of erroneous
findings. However, application of the more narrowly tailored language
of the intended-audience test will provide more specific guidance to the
courts and therefore reduce this risk.138 For example, in Newton the court
Role of the Intended Audience in Musical Copyright Infringement, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 395, 428
(1991-1992) (discussing how "Hinshaw's concerns about an unwieldy potential" can be controlled
with relatively few safeguards.).
130 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
131 See Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of
the Intended Audience in Musical Copyright Infringement, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 395,428 (1991-1992)
(arguing that "so long as courts hesitate to apply the intended-audience test ... courts run the risk of
too often finding infringement where none actually exists, or vice versa. ").
132 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.
1977).
133

See id.

Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990).
135 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424-425 (9th Cir. 1987).
136 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977).
137 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
138 See Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990).
134
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looked to the opinions of renowned music theorists in determining
whether the appropriation was substantial or de minimis. 139 In doing so
the court was essentially looking to the reaction of those with sufficient
expertise to understand the language of the work, or the intended
audience. 140 Another court faced with a similar factual scenario could
just as easily look to the reaction of the ordinary observer under the
explicit language of the average-audience test, and thereby inconsistently
analyze the similarity of the works in question. 141 However, with the
firm guidance of the intended-audience test, any court faced with such a
scenario would be guided to the specific reaction of those people who·
possess the relevant expertise to understand the language of the work in
question. 142
Modem music continues to expand in diversity, scope, and style. 143
Such genres as jazz, avant-garde music, minimalism, microtonal music,
electronic a, and world music continue to increase the palette of musical
form and expression. l44 This expansion of the modem musical idiom
will only further expose the inadequacies of the average-audience test in
cases of compositional copyright infringement. As seen in Newton,
application of the average audience standard to a case involving the
appropriation of a written score of an avant-garde jazz composition by a
sound recording of a popular rap song has the potential to create
confusing and inconsistent results. 145 A more narrowly tailored focus on
the intended audience of the plaintiff s work founded on a protection of
that plaintiff s market would afford the courts increased guidance in an
ever-expanding musical landscape.
Perhaps most important, the intended-audience test would signal a
return to copyright's fundamental purpose: the protection of the creator's
market. 146 Reliance upon the average audience and the lay observer has
139 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1l89, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); See also
http://education.nyu.edu/musiclfaculty/ferrara_lawrence.htmI
140compareNewtonv.Diamond,388F.3dI189,1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (relying on Beastie
Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara to determine the substantiality of the sample), with Dawson v.
Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that the Ninth Circuit holding in Krofft looked
to "the specific audience for which the products were intended.").
141 See Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731,737 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that "a lay person's
reaction might not be an accurate indicator of how expert choral directors would compare two
spiritual arrangements.").
142 See id. at 736 (holding that "the court's inquiry should focus on whether a member of the
intended audience would find the two works to be substantially similar.").
143 Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 04-1219).
144

[d.

145

See generally, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731,734 (4th Cir. 1990).

146
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fueled the development of a test that is overbroad and increasingly
unable to fulfill the purpose for which it was created.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Newton v. Diamond, the Ninth Circuit has chosen explicitly to
adopt the average-audience test when detennining de minimis copying in
copyright infringement actions. 147 However, its reliance upon the
testimony of expert witnesses with specific knowledge relevant to the
work suggests that the court was looking not to the response of the
average audience but to the response of the intended audience for whom
the copyrighted work was created.
Additionally, other landmark
copyright cases decided by the Ninth Circuit have similarly considered
the audience to whom the copyrighted work was directed while
148
employing the average audience and lay observer language.
Although
effectively applying a much narrower test, in Newton the Ninth Circuit
has chosen to continue to propagate the vagueness and ambiguity that
surrounds substantial similarity and de minimis analysis. The court
would have been much better served by narrowing the scope of the test
to that which it effectively applied: the intended-audience test.
149
Music is a language that continues to grow and expand.
Modem
music includes an array of diverse genres that cross-pollinate and inspire
new forms of music. 150 The clash of such genres is exemplified in
Newton by an analysis that must look to the similarities of a written score
of an avant-garde jazz flute composition and a sound recording of a
popular rap song. 151 In order to better serve the needs of such complex
and diverse problems, the Ninth Circuit should have elected to shed the
outdated and vague language of the average-audience test and adopted a
more focused analysis which remains true to the fundamental purpose of
copyright law. The Ninth Circuit should have expressly adopted the
intended-audience test.

147
148

See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.

1977).
149 See Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2004) (No. 04-1219).
150 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
lSI See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004).
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